Rus Articles Journal

How the French revolution made revolution in military science? Part 2.

New organization of army proved to be quite effective already in revolutionary wars. Later, at Bonaparte - especially. But each army suits the, certain tactical schemes.

The new organization of army complicated use of linear tactics. Nevertheless she demands the most severe discipline like “soldier is afraid of the corporal`s stick, than a bullet more“.

Actually in France spoke several decades about possible acceptance of new tactics. Argued rather theoretically.

With revolution to the French military leaders was already necessary not to look for

theoretically and the choice special was not.

Was necessary to work with what was.

After an initial mess began reforms. In particular, the semi-crews uniting old royal battalions with again gathered were formed.

At Bonaparte the main tactical unit became the infantry regiment uniting three types of military forces: infantry, cavalry, artillery. Difference from old type of the organization (which neighbors still adhered): at linear construction maneuver all line. Here it is more preferable the small compact armies soldered by training and ideal obedience. The striking factor - synchronous fire. Not aim, but dense.

This system which showed efficiency accepted practically all countries of Europe.

I it did not suit revolutionary army at all. But by itself the idea of attack by a chain came.

the Rarefied chain:

- less close line suffers from dense

fire - can quicker attack

- more maneuverable districts

- flexibly “flows round“ obstacles

- uses obstacles for shelter

- there is no solid volley, but there is a possibility of individual aim firing

But everything has also minuses. Usually they - the back of pluses.

- a chain is much less operated

- the responsibility of each certain soldier who is not directed by a dense system

is sharply increased - the role of the authority of the commander conducting soldiers on counter fire out of a system

is high - it is difficult to lift soldiers in attack from - for shelters behind which they, naturally, try to hide

the Main complexity it appeared to direct a loose system to the opponent. In near fight everything was better, but it is necessary to reach still! Something was found average between a loose system and the dense line: column. Noticed that at danger, under fire, soldiers are much more confident in a dense column. In which similarity they also if necessary get off.

the Column as fighting construction was known long ago, but is not especially usable before the French revolution. In new conditions it was effective. We remember Suvorov: “There are godless, windy, mad frantsuzishka. They are at war on Germans and others columns. Whether is to us it happened against them, it is necessary to beat to us them with columns“.

great Suvorov Allowed use of columns and against Turks, in need of break. Noting that the need in that was not yet.

the Column was used together with a loose system. Ahead a chain of shooters, part - with the cut weapon. Their task - aim fire, it is desirable on commanders. Quickly approaching, the column is reconstructed in the attacking order. Everything is dynamic!

Put the commander - the general coordination in the field, strategy on theater of war.

Is conditional: “from above“ strategic tasks are set.

On places tactics, ways of the decision are defined by commanders.

This principle works everywhere. The role of identity of the soldier, commanders of all levels grows.

Army breaks on rather small (in comparison with former) parts. Large divisions gather for the night and to fight; on march can separately move. Down there is no need to bed camp, it is possible to take place on a billeting in the settlement. It is clear, that not to avoid thefts and marauding. And desertions. But nevertheless unlike Prussian army, supervision was not required for each soldier. In normal conditions there was enough self-discipline, a collectivism and the authority of commanders. From here - mobility.

Is entered the field artillery - facilitated mobile. Even before revolution the French artillery passed from “private carrying“ to own horses. Approximately same reforms went in Russia …

the system of supply Changed. It seems that Napoleon aspired to a mobility maximum. On theater of war even officers (not noblemen are aristocrats) carry supplies in satchels. I met the statement that at the beginning of officers with satchels the opponent took for unter, so it was atypical. Supply with local means, too difficult to old armies was widely used. There everything was necessary to regulate and control. Weakening of the discipline of the rod led to mass desertion.

Revolutionary army - “national“. The lodging for the night, partially contents (at least for the period of a billeting) troops were imputed to the population a duty. Naturally, and education was sharpened on conflict prevention.

By the way, you should not be deceived about “nationality“. Some feeling of unity, ““, of course, was. But we will consider: the national consciousness is only formed. …

the Army effectively “milled“ class communications citizens and peasants in soldiers. That in Europe that in Russia.